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Abstract
We use the standard three-party Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) set-
ting in order to play general three-player non-cooperative symmetric games.
We analyze how the peculiar non-factorizable joint probabilities that may
emerge in the EPR setting can change outcome of the game. Our setup
requires that the quantum game attains classical interpretation for factor-
izable joint probabilities. We analyze the generalized three-player game
of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and show that the players can indeed escape
from the classical outcome of the game because of non-factorizable joint
probabilities. This result for three-player PD contrasts strikingly with our
earlier result for two-player PD for which even non-factorizable joint prob-
abilities are not found to be helpful to escape from the classical outcome
of the game.
1 Introduction
The usual approach to quantum games [1] considers an initial (entangled!) quan-
tum state on which players perform local actions (strategies) and the state
evolves to the final state. Payoffs are generated in the last step involving quan-
tum measurement on the final state. This approach assumes familiarity with
the concepts of product or entangled quantum state(s), expectation values, trace
operation, density operators, and the theory of quantum measurement.
This paper presents a probabilistic approach to quantum games that con-
structs true quantum games from probabilities only. Our motivation has been
to present quantum game to the wider audience, especially to those readers who
use elements of game theory but find the concepts of quantum mechanics rather
alien. We use probabilities to construct quantum games because, after all, Bell
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inequalities [2] can also be understood in this way, widely believed to express
the true quantum behavior.
We extend our probabilistic framework [3] for two-player quantum games
to mutliplayer case, while using non-factorizable joint probabilities to construct
quantum games. Apart from opening quantum games to the readers outside of
the quantum physics, this framework provides a unifying perspective on both
the classical and the quantum games.
2 Three-player, two-strategy, non-cooperative,
symmetric games
We consider three-player symmetric games for which players’ pure strategies are
given as Alice: S1, S2; Bob: S
′
1, S
′
2; Chris: S
′′
1 , S
′′
2 , and players’ payoff relations
are
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = α, α, α;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = β, δ, δ;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = δ, β, δ;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = δ, δ, β;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) = ǫ, θ, θ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = θ, ǫ, θ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = θ, θ, ǫ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) = ω, ω, ω,
(1)
where the subscripts refer to the players, the three entries in braces on left
side are pure strategies of Alice, Bob, and Chris, respectively, and the three
entries on right are their payoffs. The three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma offers an
example of such a game.
2.1 Three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma
In this game each of the three players Alice, Bob, and Chris has two pure
strategies: C (Cooperation) and D (Defection). Using the notation introduced
in (1) we associate
Alice: S1 ∼ C, S2 ∼ D; Bob: S
′
1 ∼ C, S
′
2 ∼ D; Chris: S
′′
1 ∼ C, S
′′
2 ∼ D. (2)
The three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma [4] is defined by requiring that S2 is a
dominant choice for each player:
ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ),
ΠA(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ), (3)
ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ),
and similar inequalities hold for players Bob and Chris. Secondly, a player is
better off if more of his opponents choose to cooperate:
ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ).
(4)
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Thirdly, if one player’s choice is fixed, the other two players are left in the
situation of a two-player PD:
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > (1/2) {ΠA(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) + ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 )} ,
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > (1/2) {ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) + ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 )} .
(5)
Using the notation (1) these conditions require
a) β > α, ω > ǫ, θ > δ
b) β > θ > ω, α > δ > ǫ
c) δ > ω, α > θ, δ > (1/2)(ǫ+ θ), α > (1/2)(δ + β)
(6)
3 Playing three-player games using coins
The above game can be played using coins and in the following we consider two
setups to achieve this.
3.1 Three-coin setup
This setup involves sharing three coins among Alice, Bob, and Chris. We define
pure strategies by the association:
S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ∼ flip, S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ∼ do not flip, Head ∼ +1, Tail ∼ −1, (7)
and play the game as follows. In a run each player receives a coin in ‘head up’
state which s/he can ‘flip’ or ‘does not flip’. After players’ actions the coins are
passed to a referee. The referee observes the coins and rewards the players. A
player can play a mixed strategy (definable for many runs) by flipping his/her
coin with some probability. This allows us to write mixed strategies as (x, y, z)
where x, y, and z are the probabilities with which Alice, Bob, and Chris flip
their coins, respectively. The mixed-strategy payoff relations read
ΠA,B,C(x, y, z) = xyz(α, α, α) + x(1 − y)z(δ, β, δ) + xy(1 − z)(δ, δ, β)+
x(1 − y)(1− z)(ǫ, θ, θ) + (1 − x)yz(β, δ, δ) + (1− x)(1 − y)z(θ, θ, ǫ)+
(1− x)y(1 − z)(θ, ǫ, θ) + (1 − x)(1 − y)(1− z)(ω, ω, ω)
(8)
Assuming (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆) to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) requires:
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠA(x, y
⋆, z⋆) > 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠB(x
⋆, y, z⋆) > 0,
ΠC(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆, z) > 0.
(9)
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3.2 Six-coin setup
This setup translates playing of a three-player game in terms of joint probabili-
ties which may attain the unusual character of being non-factorizable for certain
quantum systems. The setup thus allows how non-factorizable (quantum) prob-
abilities lead to game-theoretic consequences.
In this setup, each player receives two coins (either one can be in head or
tail state) and each player chooses one out of the two coins given to him/her.
Players pass three chosen coins to the referee who tosses the three chosen coins
and observes the outcome. After many runs the referee rewards the players.
Players’ strategies are defined by establishing the association:
S1, S
′
1, S
′
1 ∼ choose the first coin, S2, S
′
2, S
′
2 ∼ choose the second coin
(10)
A player plays a pure strategy when h/she chooses the same coin for all runs.
He/she plays a mixed-strategy if he/she chooses her/his first coin with some
probability over many runs. We define x, y, and z to be the probabilities of
choosing the first coin by Alice, Bob, and Chris, respectively.
Note that the quantities x, y, and z, though being mathematically similar
in three- and six-coin setups, are physically different in the following sense.
In three-coin setup does not require many runs for the pure-strategy game.
Whereas in the six-coin setup many runs are required for both the ‘pure strategy’
and the ‘mixed strategy’ games.
In six-coin setup one can define the individual coin probabilities as
r = Pr(+1;S1), r
′ = Pr(+1;S′1), r
′′ = Pr(+1;S′′1 ),
s = Pr(+1;S2), s
′ = Pr(+1;S′2), s
′′ = Pr(+1;S′′2 ),
(11)
then factorizability of joint probabilities is expressed, for example, as
Pr(+1,−1,−1;S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = s(1− r
′)(1 − s′′). (12)
We define pure-strategy payoffs by the expressions like
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = (α, α, α)sr
′r′′ + (δ, β, δ)s(1− r′)r′′ + (δ, δ, β)sr′(1− r′′)+
(ǫ, θ, θ)s(1− r′)(1 − r′′) + (β, δ, δ)(1 − s)r′r′′ + (θ, θ, ǫ)(1− s)(1− r′)r′′+
(θ, ǫ, θ)(1− s)r′(1 − r′′) + (ω, ω, ω)(1− s)(1 − r′)(1− r′′),
(13)
while the mixed-strategy payoffs are
ΠA,B,C(x, y, z) = xyzΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) + x(1 − y)zΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 )+
xy(1− z)ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) + x(1− y)(1 − z)ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 )+
(1− x)yzΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) + (1− x)(1 − y)zΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
1 )+
(1− x)y(1 − z)ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) + (1 − x)(1 − y)(1− z)ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ).
(14)
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A triple (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆) is a NE when
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠA(x, y
⋆, z⋆) > 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠB(x
⋆, y, z⋆) > 0,
ΠC(x
⋆, y⋆, z⋆)−ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆, z) > 0.
(15)
3.3 Playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider playing three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) using the three-coin
setup. The triple (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆) = (0, 0, 0) ∼ (D,D,D) comes out as the unique
NE at which the three players are rewarded as ΠA(0, 0, 0) = ΠB(0, 0, 0) =
ΠC(0, 0, 0) = ω. In six-coin setup we analyze this game when (s, s
′, s′′) =
(0, 0, 0), saying that the probability of getting head from each player’s second
coin is zero. This reduces the Nash inequalities (15) to
(x⋆ − x) {y⋆z⋆(rr′r′′)∆1 + r(z
⋆r′′ + y⋆r′)∆2 + r∆3} ≥ 0,
(y⋆ − y) {x⋆z⋆(rr′r′′)∆1 + r
′(z⋆r′′ + x⋆r)∆2 + r
′∆3} ≥ 0,
(z⋆ − z) {x⋆y⋆(rr′r′′)∆1 + r
′′(y⋆r′ + x⋆r)∆2 + r
′′∆3} ≥ 0,
(16)
where ∆1 = (α− β − 2δ+ 2θ+ ǫ− ω), ∆2 = (δ − ǫ− θ+ ω), and ∆3 = (ǫ− ω).
Now for PD we have ∆3 < 0 and (D,D,D) comes out the unique NE. This is
described by saying that when (s, s′, s′′) = (0, 0, 0) and the joint probabilities
are factorizable the triple (D,D,D) comes out as the unique NE.
We notice that the requirement (s, s′, s′′) = (0, 0, 0) can also be translated
as constraints on the joint probabilities involved in the six-coin setup. For this
we first denote these joint probabilities as
p1 = rr
′r′′,
p2 = r(1 − r
′)r′′,
p3 = rr
′(1− r′′),
p4 = r(1 − r
′)(1 − r′′),
...
p33 = rs
′s′′,
p34 = r(1 − s
′)s′′,
p35 = rs
′(1− s′′),
p36 = r(1 − s
′)(1 − s′′),
...
p61 = (1− s)s
′s′′,
p62 = (1− s)(1− s
′)s′′,
p63 = (1− s)s
′(1 − s′′),
p64 = (1− s)(1− s
′)(1− s′′),
(17)
which allows us to re-express the payoff relations (13) as
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = (α, α, α)p9 + (δ, β, δ)p10 + (δ, δ, β)p11+
(ǫ, θ, θ)p12 + (β, δ, δ)p13 + (θ, θ, ǫ)p14 + (θ, ǫ, θ)p15 + (ω, ω, ω)p16 etc.
(18)
Now, in the six-coin setup, the requirement (s, s′, s′′) = (0, 0, 0) makes thirty-
seven joint probabilities to vanish:
p(9,10,11,12,17,19,21,23,25,26,29,30,33,34,35,37,38,39,41,42,43,44,45,46,49,50,51,52,53,55,57,58,59,60,61,62,63) = 0,
(19)
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which simplifies the pure-strategy payoff relations (18) to
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = (α, α, α)p1 + (δ, β, δ)p2 + (δ, δ, β)p3+
(ǫ, θ, θ)p4 + (β, δ, δ)p5 + (θ, θ, ǫ)p6 + (θ, ǫ, θ)p7 + (ω, ω, ω)p8;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = (β, δ, δ)p13 + (θ, θ, ǫ)p14 + (θ, ǫ, θ)p15 + (ω, ω, ω)p16;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = (δ, β, δ)p18 + (ǫ, θ, θ)p20 + (θ, θ, ǫ)p22 + (ω, ω, ω)p24;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = (δ, δ, β)p27 + (ǫ, θ, θ)p28 + (θ, ǫ, θ)p31 + (ω, ω, ω)p32;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) = (ǫ, θ, θ)p36 + (ω, ω, ω)p40;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = (θ, ǫ, θ)p47 + (ω, ω, ω)p48;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = (θ, θ, ǫ)p54 + (ω, ω, ω)p56;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) = (ω, ω, ω)p64.
(20)
These payoff relations ensure that for factorizable joint probabilities the classical
outcome of the game results.
4 Three-player quantum games
We consider three-party EPR setting [2] to play a three-player symmetric game
such that each player’s two directions of measurement are his/her pure strate-
gies. In analogy with the six-coin setup, this is achieved by establishing the
association:
S1, S
′
1, S
′
1 ∼ choose the first direction,
S2, S
′
2, S
′
2 ∼ choose the second direction.
(21)
Now, in a run, each player chooses one direction out of the two and the
referee is informed about players’ choices. The referee rotates Stern-Gerlach
type apparatus along the three chosen directions and performs (quantum) mea-
surement, the outcome of which, along all the three directions, is either +1 or
−1.
Comparing the three-party EPR setting to the six-coin setup shows that in
a run, choosing between two directions of measurement is similar to choosing
between the two coins. The outcome of (quantum) measurement is +1 or −1
as it is the case with the coins.
We now denote the joint probabilities in the three-party EPR setting as
p1 = Pr(+1,+1,+1;S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ),
p2 = Pr(+1,−1,+1;S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ),
p3 = Pr(+1,+1,−1;S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ),
p4 = Pr(+1,−1,−1;S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ),
...
p61 = Pr(−1,+1,+1;S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
p62 = Pr(−1,−1,+1;S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
p63 = Pr(−1,+1,−1;S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
p64 = Pr(−1,−1,−1;S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
(22)
which for coins are reduced to the factorizable joint probabilities involved in the
six-coin setup.
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Quantum mechanics imposes constraints on the joint probabilities involved
in the three-party EPR setting. These are usually known as the normalization
and the causal communication constraints [5]. Normalization says that
∑8
i=1 pi = 1,
∑16
i=9 pi = 1, ...
∑64
i=57 pi = 1. (23)
While, the causal communication constraint is expressed as
∑4
i=1 pi =
∑20
i=17 pi =
∑28
i=25 pi =
∑36
i=33 pi∑8
i=5 pi =
∑24
i=21 pi =
∑32
i=29 pi =
∑40
i=37 pi∑12
i=9 pi =
∑44
i=41 pi =
∑52
i=49 pi =
∑60
i=57 pi∑16
i=13 pi =
∑48
i=45 pi =
∑56
i=53 pi =
∑64
i=61 pi
(24)
∑4
i=1 p2i−1 =
∑8
i=5 p2i−1 =
∑16
i=13 p2i−1 =
∑24
i=21 p2i−1∑4
i=1 p2i =
∑8
i=5 p2i =
∑16
i=13 p2i =
∑24
i=21 p2i∑12
i=9 p2i−1 =
∑20
i=17 p2i−1 =
∑28
i=25 p2i−1 =
∑32
i=29 p2i−1∑12
i=9 p2i =
∑20
i=17 p2i =
∑28
i=25 p2i =
∑32
i=29 p2i
(25)
p1 + p2 + p5 + p6 = p17 + p18 + p21 + p22 = p9 + p10 + p13 + p14 = p49 + p50 + p53 + p54,
p3 + p4 + p7 + p8 = p19 + p20 + p23 + p24 = p11 + p12 + p15 + p16 = p51 + p52 + p55 + p56,
p25 + p26 + p29 + p30 = p33 + p34 + p37 + p38 = p41 + p42 + p45 + p46 = p57 + p58 + p61 + p62,
p27 + p28 + p31 + p32 = p35 + p36 + p39 + p40 = p43 + p44 + p47 + p48 = p59 + p60 + p63 + p64.
(26)
Essentially, these constraints state that, in a run, on referee’s measurement,
the outcome of +1 or −1 along Alice’s chosen direction is independent of what
choices Bob and Chris make for their directions. The same applies for Bob and
Chris.
Notice that the factorizable joint probabilities also satisfy the causal com-
munication constraint as do the three-party EPR joint probabilities. Whereas,
unlike the coin probabilities, the three-party EPR joint probabilities can be
non-factorizable. In this case if (22) are expressed as (17) one of more of the
probabilities r, r′, r′′, s, s′, s′′ becomes negative or greater than one.
4.1 Three-player quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma
Notice that the constraints (19) ensure that for a factorizable joint probabilities
the triple (D,D,D) becomes a NE and that requiring that a set of (quantum
mechanical) joint probabilities to satisfy the constraints (19) imbeds the classical
game within the corresponding quantum game.
We now consider playing the three-player PD using the three-party EPR set-
ting. We ask whether the triple (C,C,C) can be a NE for non-factorizable joint
probabilities while our setup ensures that for factorizable three-party EPR joint
probabilities the game can be interpreted classically, with the triple (D,D,D)
being its unique NE. To answer this we use (20), (23), and (24-26) to find the NE
from (15) and allow the involved joint probabilities to become non-factorizable.
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For two-player PD we have reported that (D,D,D) once again emerges as
the unique NE with the same definition of players’ strategies and under the
requirements that embed the classical game within the quantum.
For three-player PD the situation, however, comes out to be different. The
Nash inequalities for the triple (C,C,C) then read
{p5 + (α/β)p1 − p13}+ (θ/β) {p6 + p7 − p14 − p15 + (δ/θ)(p2 + p3)}+
(ω/β) {p8 − p16 + (ǫ/ω)p4} ≥ 0;
(27)
{p2 + (α/β)p1 − p18}+ (θ/β) {p4 + p6 − p20 − p22 + (δ/θ)(p3 + p5)}+
(ω/β) {p8 − p24 + (ǫ/ω)p7} ≥ 0;
(28)
{p3 + (α/β)p1 − p27}+ (θ/β) {p4 + p7 − p28 − p31 + (δ/θ)(p2 + p5)}+
(ω/β) {p8 − p32 + (ǫ/ω)p6} ≥ 0;
(29)
where α/β, θ/β, δ/θ, ω/β, ǫ/ω < 1. We find that a set of (quantum) joint
probabilities that satisfy the normalization and the causal communication con-
straints can indeed allow the inequalities (27-29) to be true. For example, take
α/β = 9/10, θ/β = 1/100, δ/θ = 1/5, ω/β = 1/100, ǫ/ω = 9/10 and assign
values to these joint probabilities as p1 = 1/10, p3 = 13/100, p5 = 16/100,
p6 = 1/10, p13 = 14/100, p15 = 2/5, p18 = 13/100, p20 = 1/4, p22 = 37/100,
p27 = 1/5 which we call as the ‘independent probabilities’. Notice that con-
straints (19) assign zero value to thirty seven joint probabilities out of the
remaining ones and using the normalization and causal communication con-
straints the values assigned to the rest of joint probabilities are then found as
p2 = 7/50, p4 = 1/100, p7 = 3/20, p8 = 21/100, p14 = 9/25, p16 = 1/10,
p24 = 1/4, p28 = 9/50, p31 = 17/50, p32 = 7/25, p36 = 19/50, p40 = 31/50,
p47 = 27/50, p48 = 23/50, p54 = 1/2, p56 = 1/2. With this the above NE
inequalities for (C,C,C) reduce to 0.106 ≥ 0, 0.096 ≥ 0, 0.017 ≥ 0 which are
trivially true.
Note that for PD we have α/β, θ/β, δ/θ, ω/β, and ǫ/ω all less than zero and
not every non-factorizable set of joint probabilities can result in (C,C,C) being
a NE. In this paper we do not explore which other NE may emerge for a given
non-factorizable set of probabilities. However, we notice that the classical out-
come of (D,D,D) being a NE remains intact even when the joint probabilities
may become non-factorizable. This means that a set of non-factorizable joint
probabilities can only add to the unique classical NE in the three-player PD.
5 Concluding remarks
We use three-party EPR setting to play a three-player symmetric noncoopera-
tive game. Players’ payoffs are re-expressed in terms of players’ choices in the
EPR setting and in terms of the joint probabilities. We use Nash inequalities
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in the six-coin setup to impose constraints on joint probabilities which ensure
that with factorizable joint probabilities the game has a classical interpreta-
tion. We then retain these constraints while allowing the joint probabilities to
become non-factorizable and find how non-factorizable probabilities may lead
to the emergence of new solutions of the game. Multi-player quantum games
are, therefore, constructed in terms of probabilities only and it is shown that
non-factorizable joint probabilities may lead to different game-theoretic out-
come(s). We find that with this framework it is hard to construct Enk & Pike
type argument [6] for a quantum game.
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